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 Introduction
 In a very broad sense, I test the hypothesis that a 
consumer cooperative holds a competitive advantage 
on the market by virtue that it is a cooperative.
 In others words I ask, are consumers willing to pay 
something extra, if necessary, when the preferred 
commodity is sold by a cooperative.
 In this case, the cooperative provides commodities 
with an additional characteristic desired by the 
consumer which improves the utility or wellbeing of 
consumers.
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 Introduction
 More specifically, this paper presents results from a 
survey experiment which examines the hypothesis 
that consumer choice is a function of relative prices, 
given income, all other things remaining the same 
(based on conventional economic theory).
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 Introduction
◦ My findings challenge the narrow economic 
worldview that only economic variables 
count; but supports a core economic 
assumption that economic variables are of 
fundamental importance to individual‘s choice 
decisions.
◦ I find that individuals are willing to make 
material sacrifice to reward organizations 
which have certain preferred or desired 
characteristics.
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 Introduction
 In this paper, it is assumed that consumer cooperatives do not 
derive an advantage in terms superior productivity or in terms of 
the quality or uniqueness of the good or service supplied.
 The cooperative advantage, where one exists, is situated in social 
cohesion and identity with the cooperative.
◦ Some economics might dub this as part of the warm glow effect 
(Andreoni)—individuals doing their shopping from an organization 
which they feel good about. This would be akin to charitable giving or 
purchasing higher priced ethical products.
 Members of the cooperative are assumed to receive a year-end 
bonus as well.
 No such material benefit exists for non-members.
◦ Such bonuses are not very different from what is offered by many non-
cooperative retailers and wholesalers.
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 Theoretical Conclusions 
 If the consumer cooperative provides no advantage 
in terms of price or quality over non-cooperative, 
the cooperative‘s market share might be greater than 
it would otherwise be due to the preference which 
cooperative members would have for cooperative 
output.
◦ Such preferences yield a degree of market power to the 
consumer cooperative (monopolistic). 
◦ But in this case there are no material benefits to society 
at large generated by the consumer cooperative per se.
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 If the consumer cooperative is not competitive in 
the domain of price and quantity, the survival of the 
cooperative critically depends on the costs which 
consumers are willing to incur in purchasing high 
priced or poor quality cooperative products.  
 In this case, consumers of cooperative products must 
be maximizing their ‗utility‘ while reducing their level 
of material wellbeing.
 U = f(M[Y], NM[SC, WG])
 Members might be willing to sacrifice real income 
and quality in consumption for the utility generated  
by the purchase of the output from the cooperative.
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 In this instance, one would expect that firm survival 
would be price sensitive and would critically depend 
on the strength of social cohesion and identity 
amongst cooperative members (Altman 2005, 2000).
 Increasing social cohesion and identity serves to 
make the demand for cooperative products more 
price inelastic.
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 To the extent that there exists no social cohesion or 
identity with regards to the cooperative, then the 
survival of the consumer cooperative critically 
depends upon its price and quality competitiveness.
 Such cooperatives are not dissimilar to the 
traditional firm (retailer or wholesaler). 
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 Consumer cooperatives which dominate the market 
can be expected to be price and quality competitive.
 Their competitiveness is enhanced by the existence 
of dimensions of social cohesion or warm glow 
amongst cooperative members.
 Social cohesion or warm glow can effect the 
elasticity of demand for the cooperative output.   
 Amongst workers in the cooperative, social cohesion 
or warm glow can positively impact on their quantity 
and quality of effort inputs per unit of time and, 
therefore, upon productivity.
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 Consumer cooperatives whose price simply matches 
that of traditional firms have an advantage over the 
latter when there exists a degree of social cohesion 
and identity amongst cooperative members.  
 This advantage increases as the strength this social-
psychological relationship increases.  
 Such cooperatives yield at least the level of material 
welfare generated by non-cooperative firms whilst 
also matching the preferences of consumers thereby 
enhancing their utility.  
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 Consumer cooperatives which survive simply on the 
basis of social cohesion and identity are socially 
costly in terms of material welfare and survive 
entirely on the basis of consumer preferences for 
cooperative products irrespective or price or quality.
 To the extent that individuals tend to be at least 
somewhat price and quality sensitive such 
cooperatives‘ survival can be predicted to be 
tentative at best.
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 Theoretical Conclusions
 To the extent that social cohesion and identity is a 
substitute (making demand price and quality 
insensitive) for economic efficiency and quality 
production, they contribute towards reducing 
society‘s overall level of material wellbeing.
◦ But the latter might be consistent with cooperative 
members‘ maximizing their utility.
 It is unlikely that such consumer cooperatives are 
sustainable in a competitive environment unless 
subsidized or if demand is highly inelastic.
2/23/2011 Altman: Consumer Cooperatives 14
 The Experiment
 The objective of the experiment is to test the 
proposition that demand is largely a function of 
relative prices, all other things remaining the same.
◦ This hypothesis is derived from the conventional economic 
modeling.
◦ If the results do not conform with this hypothesis then we 
have evidence for the significance of non-economic 
variables in the determination of demand.
◦ In this experiment, this speaks to the importance of social 
cohesion and warm glow as determinants of demand.
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 The Experiment
 I survey of over 298 students at the University of 
Saskatchewan and the University of Regina.
 Economic experiments usually have a sample size 
which are no more than 100 and typically much less 
and are more narrowly focused in terms subject 
population.
 My results are, therefore, much more statistically 
rigorous than the results from typical survey 
experiments.
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 The Experiment
 No real money is used in this experiment.
 No material incentives are built into the 
experimental framework. 
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 The Experiment
 However, this framework is not unlike what one finds 
in contingent evaluation studies where individuals 
stipulate (imagine) how much they would be willing 
to pay for a particular product at a given point in 
time. 
 Also, this is similar to many experiments in economic 
psychology and behavioral economics.
 Therefore, my results rely upon participants to 
imagine how they would behave under particular 
incentive environments.  
◦ Strong evidence that incentive do not have a 
substantive impact on experimental results.
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 The Experiment
 Null (default) Hypothesis: as the relative price of 
cooperatives output increases, demand for 
cooperative output should fall, ceteris paribus.
◦ In fact, such an increase should yield a collapse of demand 
to zero, ceteris paribus.
 If individuals maximize their utility in terms of material 
welfare, this is what one would expect.
 If one does not reduce one‘s demand to zero as relative 
price increases, one‘s real income diminishes.
 Any reduction in the demand for the coop product keeps 
real income from falling by as much as it would 
otherwise.
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 The Experiment
 If individuals are material maximizers, then if the 
price in the coop and non-coop is the same, 
individuals would be indifferent between the two 
unless non-economic variables impact upon 
individual choice.
 In reality non-coop members may not so readily 
choose to buy at coops even if the price is the same 
as in a non-coop if:
◦ They have shopped at the non-coop previously and there 
is some loyalty attached to remain a customer (path 
dependency—history matters).
◦ Transaction costs increase (start-up costs of shopping 
elsewhere) if one switches to a coop.
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 The Experiment
 Coop members would be affected by economic 
advantages (year-end bonuses) garnered from being 
cooperative members and can be expected to 
maintain purchases from cooperatives in the face of 
relative price increases to the extent that the latter 
do not outweigh their cooperative advantages.
 If the coop advantage is less than the relative price 
increase, cooperative members should reduce their 
demand to zero unless non-economic variables 
(social cohesion cum warm glow) impact upon 
individual choice.
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 The Experiment (results)
 When price is identical, both hypothetical members and non-
members of coops would purchase largely from the coop, 
albeit a larger percentage of coop members would purchase 
from the coop.
◦ About 90 percent of non-coop members would purchase from the 
coop at the lower prices (coop and non-coop price are the same).
◦ At the higher prices between 75 and 85 percent of the non-coop 
members would purchase from the coop (coop and non-coop price 
are the same).
◦ This suggests that there are strong non-economic reasons for 
people to purchase from coops and represents an important 
cooperative advantage.
◦ Over 90 percent of the coop members would purchase from the 
coops irrespective of price when the coop and non-coop price are 
the same .
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 The Experiment (results)
 When price increases the percentage of non-coop 
members and coop members who purchase from 
the coop drops.
 Also the difference or gap between the percentage 
of non-coop and coop members willing to purchase 
from the coop increases. 
◦ The demand for cooperative products diminishes at a 
faster rate amongst non-coop members. 
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 The Experiment (results)
 But even as relative price increases in the 
cooperative, a large percentage of non-coop 
members would still purchase from coops.
 40 percent at a low price (>$5)
 13 percent at a high price (>$1,000)
◦ These results suggests that even non-coop members 
retain an affinity for the consumer coop in face of 
relative price increases.
◦ This suggests the importance of non-economic variables 
at work in choice decisions.
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 The Experiment (results) 
 Given that the revealed preference of many 
consumers is the willingness to pay a higher price for 
the coop product, it might be deduced that such 
individuals derive a higher level of utility from the 
higher-priced coop product, ceteris paribus.
◦ Such individuals are willing to trade-off real income for the 
purchase of coop products.
 Of course, if the coop price was the same as the non-
coop price, the individual‘s utility would be even higher.
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 The Experiment (results)
 These results are affirmed by probit analyses of the data.
 The fact that demand is sensitive to changes in relative price 
supports a weaker version of the conventional economic wisdom 
that individuals are sensitive to relative price changes—economic 
factors impact upon individuals choice decisions.
 The experimental evidence is characterized by elastic demand 
(price elasticity greater than one) for both non-coop and coop 
members.
 Therefore any relative increase in the price of a coop product 
yields a fall in income.
 This elasticity is greater for products at the higher price point and 
is also greatest for the non-coop members at the initial increase in 
relative price—when the coop price is first increased above that 
of the non-coop price.
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 To illustrate the impact which the estimated elasticities 
have upon income as relative price increases, I simulate 
the income of the coop as relative price increases.
 I assume that the market for the coop and non-coop 
firms comprise of 1,000 units and that these 1,000 units 
are purchased either from the coops or non-coops.
 Income falls as price increase when the percentage 
increase in price is less than the percentage decrease in 
demand.
 Income diminishes as prices increase with regards to the 
demand from coop members or non-members.
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 The Experiment (Conclusions)
 Both economic social variables impact upon the 
choice decisions of subjects.
 Ceteris paribus, coop members have a stronger 
affinity (warm glow) for coop products irrespective 
of price.
 Non-coop members have an affinity (warm-glow) for 
coop output even though this involves some material 
self-sacrifice.
 There is little difference in responses when the coop 
is hypothesized to be consumer controlled or labor 
controlled.
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 The Experiment (Conclusions)
 At identical prices the coop advantage is huge.
◦ Given individual preferences which are predisposed 
towards cooperatives, coops have a competitive advantage 
over non-coops, ceteris paribus.
◦ This advantage can be expected to be diminished by a 
positive reputation of the non-coop and consumer loyalty.
 The coop advantage diminishes as relative price 
increases and coop income diminishes.
 If coop members were income maximizers they 
would keep prices on par with non-coop.
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 The Experiment (Conclusions)
 The coop advantage provides coops with a 
protective belt against competition from non-
coops—a monopolistic position on the market.
 This allows coops to produce inefficiently and 
survive on the competitive market.
 However, efficient coops can dominate the market, 
ceteris paribus.
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 The Experiment (Conclusions)
 The cooperative advantage can be used to protect 
inefficient firms or to increase market share.
 The coop advantage also provides coop with 
flexibility to transform itself from inefficient to 
efficient supplies given that inefficient coop will not 
easily be wiped out of the market.
◦ But social variables go only so far, and high priced-
inefficient cooperatives will suffer the wrath of 
consumers searching for relatively low priced-high quality 
output.
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 The Experiment (Conclusions)
 Our experimental results speak to the potential 
strength of consumer coops in competitive markets.
 This relates to the pro-coop preferences of subjects.
 A important question which must be asked of any 
social science experimental result is are such 
preferences global in nature and how do they evolve.
 Be this as it may, consumer cooperatives appear to 
have more degrees of freedom to increase their 
market share, especially if they are well managed, 
responding to the price and quality concerns of 
consumers. 
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PROBIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY: 
ALL THE VARIABLES IN MODEL ARE DUMMY VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT VAR  WILL BUY – TAKES A VALUE OF 1 IF INDIVIDUALS 
BUY,ELSE 0 
Eq1: Will buy
 
= β0 + β1 FCOOP + β2 MEMBER + β3 CANADIAN + β4 CHINESE +   
   β5 ECONOMICS  
Marginal Effects 
Entire Sample  
Base Case: Not Familiar 
FCOOP: 0.048194 
Base Case: Not Member 
MEMBER: 0.15109 
 
FEMALE SAMPLE 
Base Case: Not Familiar 
FCOOP: 0.092212 
Base Case: Not Member 
MEMBER: 0.13729 
 
MALE  SAMPLE 
Base Case: Not Familiar 
FCOOP : 0.016427 
Base Case: Not Member 
MEMBER:  0.16290 
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Consumer Cooperative Survey Questionnaire
Consumer Behavior and Consumer Cooperatives
General Survey
You are about to participate in a research project on Consumer Behavior with respect to consumer 
cooperatives. 
The consumer cooperative can take different forms such as grocery, hardware store, or department store.
Completing the questionnaire should take about 15 minutes. 
Please do not speak with the other participants in the room during the session. 
Please answer the following questions carefully.
First, please provide the following information about yourself:
Age: __________
Sex: Male / Female
Place of Origin: Canada / Other (Please specify—Mainland China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, India, USA, etc): 
___________
Major: Economics / Other (Please specify): ___________
Year of Study: Undergraduate / Graduate
Are you familiar with consumer cooperatives? Yes/No ____________
Are you a member of a cooperative? Yes/No _________________
Do you work for a cooperative? Yes/No _____________________
Would you consider yourself to be politically left, right or middle of the road?
Left/Right/Middle _________________
After-tax income (including parental or other support): $____________ per month
Is your housing paid for by a third party (i.e. parents, friends, scholarships)? Yes / No
Is your tuition paid for by a third party (i.e. parents, friends, scholarships)? Yes / No

PART A2
A. Labor controlled consumer cooperative
B. You are a member (You receive a year-end share of profits based on purchases and can 
participate in coop meetings)
Questions as in A1 
PART B1
A. Consumer controlled cooperative (workers are simply employees as one would find in typical 
private firm such as IGA, Safeway, Canadian Tire.
B. You are not a member.
Questions as in A1 
PART B2
A. Consumer controlled cooperative (workers are simply employees as one would find in typical 
private firm such as IGA, Safeway, Canadian Tire.
B. You are a member (You receive a year-end share of profits based on purchases and can 
participate in coop meetings).
Questions as in A1 
